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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-3191
__________
SANDRA HARMON,
Appellant
v.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, Sussex Co. Delaware; JASON ADKINS, individually
and in his capacity as defense counsel for Sussex County Administration; SUSSEX
COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT & APPEALS MEMBERS; DALE
CALLAWAY, Chairman individually and in his capacity as Chairman; ELLEN MAGEE,
individually and in her capacity as a board member; J. BRUCE MEARS, individually and
in his capacity as a board member; JOHN MILLS, individually and in his capacity as a
board member; E. BRENT WORKMAN, individually and in his capacity as a board
member; SUSSEX COUNTY ADMINISTRATION
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-cv-01021)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 20, 2020
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 27, 2020)
___________
OPINION *
___________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Sandra Harmon appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her
complaint. For the reasons detailed below, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment
and remand for further proceedings.
Harmon owned real property in Rehoboth Beach, Delaware. In January 2018,
Sussex County commenced a monition 1 action against Harmon to collect delinquent
sewer and water bills and costs incurred when it demolished her fire-damaged home.
Harmon claims that she paid the sewer and water bills, but that Sussex County and the
individual defendants never consulted with her about the demolition costs, failed to give
her notice of the monition action, charged excessively high interest on the demolition
costs, and sold the property at a sheriff’s sale without providing her with a reasonable
time to pay the outstanding costs. She filed a complaint in District Court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that the defendants had violated her constitutional rights.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that, because the state monition
action remained ongoing, the District Court should abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971). The District Court granted the motion. Harmon filed a timely notice of
appeal. 2

1

“Monition” is “a legal process in the nature of a summons or citation to appear and
answer (as in default of performing some certain act).” Monition, Merriam-Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary (2016).
2

Harmon also filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied.
Because Harmon did not file a timely new or amended notice of appeal encompassing the
order denying her motion for reconsideration, we lack jurisdiction to consider that order.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir.
2

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review
over whether the requirements for abstention have been met.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598
F.3d 139, 145–46 (3d Cir. 2010).
We will vacate the District Court’s judgment. The Court concluded that
abstention under Younger was appropriate because “(1) there are ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state
interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise the
federal claims.” ECF No. 23 at 6. These factors were set forth in Middlesex County
Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
However, in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013), the
Supreme Court “narrowed Younger’s domain.” Malhan v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of State, 938
F.3d 453, 462 (3d Cir. 2019). “The Court explained—and we have stressed several times
since—that the ‘three Middlesex conditions’ are no longer the test for Younger
abstention.” Id. (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81). Rather, courts must first analyze
whether the parallel state action falls within one of “three exceptional categories”: (1)
criminal prosecutions, (2) “certain civil enforcement proceedings,” and (3) “civil
proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to
perform their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78 (quotation marks, alteration
omitted).

2008).
3

The District Court therefore failed to apply the proper standard. See Hamilton v.
Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining, in similar circumstances, that
“[b]y not applying the correct test for Younger abstention, the District Court erred”).
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand so that it can
decide, in the first instance, whether the state monition action falls within one of the three
classes of cases described by Sprint. 3

3

We express no opinion about whether the monition action does fall within one of these
classes of cases, whether Harmon’s claims have merit, or whether the defendants have
other meritorious defenses.
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